THE importance of the Battle of Jutland in quelling the blockade breaking aspirations of Germany’s surface fleet during WWI cannot be over emphasised.

Neither can the sacrifices made by the sailors of both sides.

Some years earlier the Admiralty Board produced a set of detailed war plans that were to spell out its strategy towards Germany well into the beginning of the First World War. The 1907/1908 War Plans included the resurrection of the strategy of the ‘close blockade’. 

The major offensive Plan ‘C’ , specified the “blockade of North Sea German ports, obstruction of the Elbe and destruction of entrances, defences, dockyards and channels of the Baltic ports”. Attention would be concentrated on the German naval fleet. 

However sophisticated the Admiralty War Plans of 1907/8 may have appeared to be, old values persisted. First Sea Lord Admiral Fisher, along with others still yearned for glory in battle. 

Fisher believed and hoped that blockade mines would be internationally outlawed – he well understood the value of mines to the blockader. When Prime Minister Mr Balfour enquired about their use against German ports the ‘Admiralty’ compiled for the First Sea Lord as a response a comprehensive document that included a statement of their Lordships’ real intentions: “Of course, our great objective is to destroy his (Germany’s) ships. The quickest and most certain way of doing so is by a second Trafalgar, a great fleet action, in which our superior strength in ships will assure us victory.”

The note clearly indicates that Fisher and his Admirals wanted a Grand Fleet action in open water. 

The conduct of the engagement with the enemy was ultimately totally influenced by the actions of gung-ho socialite Vice-Admiral Beatty in command of his battlecruiser force. 

Beatty made several influential bad decisions, none more dangerous than ordering that extra cordite charges to be stockpiled in the gun turrets and all safety doors accessing the ammunition magazines be left open. Beatty’s cavalier order was based on Nelson’s Trafalgar of 1805 when rapid fire was the order of the day. 

HMS Queen Mary, HMS Indefatigable and HMS Invincible were all lost when the ‘Flash’ from German shells ignited the unprotected cordite. Beatty’s own ship HMS Lion was similarly hit in ‘Q’ turret, but saved when Royal Marine Major Harvey, although mortally wounded, ordered the closing of the magazine doors and flooding of the cordite store. Beatty thus survived. 

The desire for a ‘Death and Glory’ second Trafalgar had become a tradition with many of the officer class. Essentially the Admiralty had made their minds up to force a second ‘Trafalgar’. They clearly had not factored in the incompetence of one of their number.