MILITARY and political leaders failed to act quickly enough to counter the threat from Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and provide better armoured vehicles to British forces occupying Iraq, the Chilcot Inquiry has found.

Sir John Chilcot's long-awaited report said the Ministry of Defence (MoD) was ''slow'' in responding to the potential for casualties from the home-made bombs, which became an everyday problem faced by British personnel in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

He laid into delays in providing an additional type of Protected Patrol Vehicles (PPVs) which was not ordered until 2006, after ministerial intervention, despite initial work on sourcing it starting ''before 2002''.

The widespread use of the light ''snatch Land Rover'' during the conflict has long been criticised by many families of those killed in the conflict.

Soldiers reportedly nicknamed them ''mobile coffins'' because of the limited protection they gave to roadside IEDs and families of several of those killed are suing the MoD over their use.

Forces taking part in Operation Telic, as the invasion and occupation was known, also suffered from a shortage of helicopter support and equipment for what is known as Istar - intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance, the report found.

Sir John's report said: ''Between 2003 and 2009, UK forces in Iraq faced gaps in some key capability areas, including protected mobility, Istar and helicopter support.

''It was not sufficiently clear which person or department within the MoD had responsibility for identifying and articulating capability gaps.

''Delays in providing medium weight protected patrol vehicles (PPVs) and the failure to meet the needs of UK forces in MND (SE) (Multi-National Division South East - the British sector of Iraq) for Istar and helicopters should not have been tolerated.

''The MoD was slow in responding to the developing threat in Iraq from improvised explosive devices.

"The range of protected mobility options available to commanders in MND (SE) was limited. Although work had begun before 2002 to source an additional PPV, it was only ordered in July 2006 following ministerial intervention.''

The report added that, while there were no funding barriers to introducing a new PPV, it criticises the Executive Committee of the Army Board for instead concentrating on its Future Rapid Effect System programme, which was focused on bigger armoured vehicles.

It added: ''The decision to deploy troops to Afghanistan had a material impact on the availability of key capabilities for deployment to Iraq, particularly helicopters and Istar.''